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This Note offers a solution to the unique privacy issues posed by
the increasingly humanlike interactions users have with virtual
assistants, such as Amazon's Alexa, which accompany smart-home
technology. These interactions almost certainly result in the users
engaging in the cognitive phenomenon of anthropomorphism-more
specifically, an assignment of agency. This is a phenomenon that has
heretofore been ignored in the legal context, but both the rapidity of
technological advancement and inadequacy of current applicable legal
doctrine necessitate its consideration now. Since users view these
anthropomorphized virtual assistants as persons rather than
machines, the law should treat them as such. To accommodate this
reality, either the courts or Congress should grant them legal
personhood. This can be accomplished through the application of an
objective test that is satisfied by the establishment of social and moral
connections with these virtual assistants. Further, due to the
paramount privacy concerns resulting from this technology's use within
the home, courts should establish a new privilege that protects the
communications between users and their virtual assistants.
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The modern digital age allows unprecedented access to the
intimate details of the lives of others; such access can now pry into the
most intimate of spaces-the home-as mart-home technology
integration becomes increasingly pervasive. Several companies
market various kinds of in-home devices that operate primarily
through user interaction with a virtual assistant-such as Google's
aptly named Assistant, Apple's Siri, and Amazon's Alexa.2 The
development of smart-home technology, culminating in this adoption
of a virtual assistant, dates back to the beginning of the twentieth
century when "[t]he idea of a home that could minimize work for its
inhabitants was sold en masse to American homemakers."3 In 1969,
1. Peter H. Kahn, Jr. et al., The New Ontological Category Hypothesis in Human-Robot
Interaction, in 6TH ACM/IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN-ROBOT INTERACTION
159, 159 (2011).
2. Brian Chen, How to Make Your House a Smart Home, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/guides/technology/how-to-make-a-smart-home [https://perma.cc/GE2N-
9A4H] (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
3. Andrew Weinreich, The Future of the Smart Home: Smart Homes & IoT: A Century
in the Making, FORBES (Dec. 18, 2017, 11:46 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
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Honeywell introduced the first official smart-home technology device,
the Honeywell Kitchen Computer, which could do only two things:
"add recipes and store recipes."4  Since then, the definition of
smart-home technology has changed due to the increased functionality
and capability of these devices. Rather than encompassing only those
tasks that automate certain physical activities within the home,
current smart-home technology is so named because of its Internet
connection and remote-control operation.5
While this Note primarily focuses on Amazon's virtual
assistant, Alexa, the analysis and solutions apply to all virtual
assistants.6 Alexa is housed inside the Amazon Echo-a cylindrical
speaker that can both receive its users' requests and make vocal
responses.7  Alexa connects continuously to the Internet-unless
turned off by the user-and operates by a simple utterance of its
name." Upon acknowledging this so-called "wake word," Alexa records
the user's request and sends it to Amazon, where an Amazon
employee fulfills the request and the recording is stored.9 While the
purveyors of virtual assistants maintain that not everything said in
the device's vicinity is recorded, the machine itself must be in a
constant state of "listening" in order to recognize its wake word.10
Mass storage of these requests and the potential for the
machine to be constantly listening give rise to legitimate privacy
concerns regarding the amount, and possible sensitive nature, of these
andrewweinreichl2017/12/18/the-future-of-the-smart-home-smart-homes-iot-a-century-in-the-
making/#1575cc8157ac.
4. Andreas Jacobsson, Assoc. Professor, Malmo Univ., Threats and Betrayal on the
Internet (May 18, 2016) (transcript available in On Privacy and Security in Smart Homes,
MEDIUM (June 13, 2016), https://medium.com/@iotap/on-privacy-and-security-in-smart-homes-
543f62aa9917 [https://perma.cc/D6R7-D3AA]).
5. Id.
6. A difference among the virtual assistants that may impact how easily they are
anthropomorphized is their names. Alexa has the most standard name that one would associate
with personhood, whereas Siri and Assistant are not necessarily immediately recognizable as
names attributable to people. This could impact the manipulation analysis that is discussed
below. See infra Part I.A.2.
7. See Richard Baguley & Colin McDonald, Appliance Science: Alexa, How Does Alexa





10. See Tim Moynihan, Alexa and Google Home Record What You Say. But What
Happens to That Data?, WIRED (Dec. 5, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/12/alexa-
and-google-record-your-voice/ [https://perma.cc/NX3U-GCRU].
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recordings." In particular, critics voice concerns about how easily the
government may access users' recordings.12 Specifically, the concerns
stem from whether the Fourth Amendment is implicated when the
government attempts to seize these recordings. The Fourth
Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
. . . houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures"13-thus,
the question presented is whether the government accessing these
recordings is "unreasonable." A court has yet to clearly resolve this
issue.14 The most likely applicable legal doctrine-the third-party
doctrine-seems to suggest that either a simple subpoena or consent
of the holder of the recordings is all that is necessary.15 Courts apply
the third-party doctrine to information that an individual voluntarily
hands over to another individual or institution.16 The Supreme Court
views this information as outside the protection of the Fourth
Amendment and thus outside of the Constitution's warrant
requirement. 17
11. See Hillary Brill & Scott Jones, Little Things and Big Challenges: Information
Privacy and the Internet of Things, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1229 (2017); Jacobsson, supra note 4.
Consumer watchdog groups have also raised alarms about the possibility that the Echo and
Google Home may be recording a much more extensive array of data than previously thought,
due to examination of certain patents for which Google and Amazon have applied. See Are Google
Home and Amazon Echo Listening More Than You Realize?, CBS NEWS (Dec. 14, 2017, 7:45 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/google-home-amazon-echo-patents-track-listen
[https://perma.cclV4CY-DEU8]. Specifically, consumer watchdog groups accuse Amazon of using
the Echo for targeted advertising, which Amazon denies. Id.
12. See, e.g., Note, If These Walls Could Talk: The Smart Home and the Fourth
Amendment Limits of the Third Party Doctrine, 130 HARv. L. REV. 1924, 1925 (2017) [hereinafter
If These Walls Could Talk] (remarking that the Fourth Amendment likely guarantees no
protection from government collection of recordings made by smart-home technology).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. The question was presented to a court during the course of a 2017 murder
investigation in Arkansas, in which Amazon refused to hand over the recordings; the issue,
however, was mooted when the accused and owner of the Amazon Echo in question willingly
acquiesced to the recordings being given to the police. See Eliott C. McLaughlin, Suspect OKs
Amazon to Hand over Echo Recordings in Murder Case, CNN (Apr. 26, 2017, 2:52 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/07/tech/amazon-echo-alexa-bentonville-arkansas-murder-
case/index.html [https://perma.cc/TTC3-PJZ9]. See generally Stipulation and Consent Order,
State v. Bates, No. CR-2016-370-2 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Mar. 6, 2017),
https://caseinfo.aoc.arkansas.gov/cconnect/PROD/public/ck-publicqry-doct.cp-dktrpt~frames?ba
ckto=P&caseid=04CR- 16-370&begin date=&end date= [https://perma.cc/FLU6-46R2].
15. Orin Kerr & Greg Nojeim, The Data Question: Should the Third-Party Records
Doctrine Be Revisited?, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/thedataquestionshouldthe -third-party-records doctrine be revisited/
[https://perma.cclYAQ2-XD44].
16. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1979).
17. Id. at 744 (stating that an individual assumes the risk that information conveyed
voluntarily to a company can be exposed by that company, thus eliminating any expectation of
privacy in that information).
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While this is a legitimate current concern in itself,1 8 another
aspect of smart-home virtual assistants like Alexa compounds this
privacy issue. Due to the conversation-like interaction between
virtual assistant users and the technology itself, users engage in the
cognitive process known as anthropomorphism.19 Specifically, people
may assign agency to their virtual assistant, believing that the
inanimate object is acting with intentions.20 This belief may become
powerful enough that people stop seeing this kind of technology as an
inanimate object entirely, instead viewing it either as another
"person" or as some kind of being in between inanimate and
animate.2 1  A growing cohort of researchers within the fields of
robotics and artificial intelligence (Al) argue that this change in the
relationship between man and machine necessitates new legal
protections, or even legal rights, for this technology.22  Courts and
legislatures should be open to accommodating the changing nature cof
the relationship between individuals and their technology rather than
steadfastly applying anachronistic law that is no longer viable.
This Note addresses the issues presented by the inevitable
anthropomorphism of smart-home technology's virtual assistants.
Part I gives an overview of the ways in which humans
anthropomorphize technology and details the legal
doctrine-grounded in one's reasonable expectation of privacy-that
controls the government's ability to obtain certain communications.
Part II considers the applicability of both anthropomorphism science
and legal doctrine to smart-home technology and its virtual assistants.
Further, it points out how currently proposed solutions to this problem
fail to acknowledge legitimate concerns about the application of
anachronistic legal doctrines to disputes involving anthropomorphized
technology. Part III offers a legal solution through either (1)
18. The viability of these concerns has been the subject of preceding commentary on
these virtual assistants, which has come to the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment provides
little, if any, protection against the government's ability to access the recordings stored by
companies like Amazon due to the third-party doctrine's likely applicability. See If These Walls
Could Talk, supra note 12, at 1945; cf. Christopher Landau & Sopan Joshi, Looking Ahead:
October Term 2017, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 253, 275-76 ("As technology becomes ever more
pervasive, the third-party doctrine will allow ever more data to be collected without a warrant on
the ground that we have 'voluntarily' provided the data to our service providers.").
19. Friederike Eyssel et al., Activating Elicited Agent Knowledge: How Robot and User
Features Shape the Perception of Social Robots, IEEE RO-MAN: 21ST INT'L SYMP. ROBOT & HUM.
INTERACTIVE COMM., Sept. 2012, at 851, 851.
20. See infra Part I.A.
21. See Kahn et al., supra note 1, at 159 (discussing that children who interact with
anthropomorphic robots tend not to see them either as fully alive or fully inanimate, but
somewhere in between); infra Part II.B.
22. See infra Part II.B.
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expanding the definition of "person" to encompass anthropomorphized
technology that is the subject of assigned agency or (2) creating a new,
objective category of legal distinction altogether. That Part then
applies this proposed distinction to existing law and offers suggestions
on how courts may use the distinction to facilitate appropriate
protections of privacy, such as the creation of a new privilege between
the anthropomorphized virtual assistant and its user. Part IV
concludes by reemphasizing the need to address these concerns now,
rather than allowing the US public to suffer continued privacy
violations under precedent that is out of line with the reality of how
users interact with and view technology today.
I. BACKGROUND
Smart-home technology represents an interesting nexus of
psychology and law, particularly with the incorporation of virtual
assistants. The fact that virtual assistants are capable of engaging
the user in a conversational manner raises questions about how
people truly perceive them.23 Relevant research suggests that users
do not view virtual assistants simply as inanimate devices but rather
as something more akin to another person.24 This is an example of the
cognitive process of anthropomorphism-the act of assigning
inanimate objects humanlike characteristics.25 Regardless of how
users perceive their relationships with virtual assistants, the nature
of the interaction between the technology and its user-specifically,
recording and storing communications-likely determines how the
government may access these recordings.26 Under the third-party
doctrine, courts would probably view the conveyed, recorded
information as wholly lacking any expectation of privacy and thus
outside the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Whether the
doctrine applies to a given recording would depend on how closely the
chosen means of information conveyance and storage resemble case
precedents.27
23. Kahn et al., supra note 1, at 159 (describing the nondichotomous characterization
children have of anthropomorphic robots, that is seeing them neither as wholly animate nor
inanimate).
24. See infra Part I.A.
25. Nicholas Epley et al., On Seeing Human: A Three-Factor Theory of
Anthropomorphism, 114 PSYCHOL. REV. 864, 864-65 (2007).
26. See infra Part II.C (discussing how the third-party doctrine is the most likely
applicable legal doctrine regarding recordings stored by smart-home technology purveyors).
27. See infra Part I.B.
1186 [Vol. 20:4:1181
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A. Anthropomorphism and Attributions of Agency
According to psychologists, "[i]mbuing the imagined or real
behavior of nonhuman agents with humanlike characteristics,
motivations, intentions, and emotions is the essence of
anthropomorphism."2 8 It "represents a process of inductive inference
about nonhuman agents . . . [comprised of] basic cognitive operations
includ[ing] the acquisition of knowledge, the activation or elicitation of
stored knowledge, and the application of activated knowledge to a
given target."29  The action of assigning agency to a nonhuman
agent-that is, believing that the agent acts with intentions-is a
process that falls within the realm of anthropomorphism.30
The way humans assign agency to nonhumans is an area of
research that recently has received significant attention.31 Scholars
present several theories about the ways humans perform this
cognitive function in the field of robotics-namely, the promiscuous
agency account, the selective agency account, and the transition
model.32 The promiscuous agency account and the selective agency
account are oppositional theories-both of which are supported by
underlying research-that disagree on whether humans innately
assign agency or instead require significant alterations in cognitive
beliefs before doing so. 3 3 Levin et al. recently developed the transition
28. Epley et al., supra note 25, at 864-65 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 865.
30. Christopher Brett Jaeger & Daniel T. Levin, If Asimo Thinks, Does Roomba Feel?
The Legal Implications of Attributing Agency to Technology, 5 J. HUM.-ROBOT INTERACTION 3, 4
n.1 (2016) ("[Use [of] the phrase 'attributions of agency' . . . refer[s] to attributions of human-like
agency, or anthropomorphic attributions." (emphasis in original)).
31. See generally Alan M. Leslie, Ori Friedman & Tim P. German, Core Mechanisms in
'Theory of Mind', 8 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 528 (2004). This research has its beginnings
grounded in research on "Theory of Mind," which focuses on finding explanations for how
humans attribute thoughts and goals to other humans and organic beings, form their mental
processes, and how these mental processes translate into behaviors. See id. at 528 (citing David
Premack & Guy Woodruff, Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?, 4 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI.
515 (1978)). Applications of Theory of Mind to robots began decades ago but focused on the
accuracy of anthropomorphic attributions to nonhuman agents rather than seeking an answer as
to why this phenomenon occurs. It was Epley et al. who were one of the first, if not the first, to
attempt to actually explain the psychological mechanisms that were the basis of
anthropomorphizing nonhuman agents rather than continuing the trend of merely measuring
accuracy or frequency of such attributions. Epley et al., supra note 25, at 865. This research
became both the bedrock of and preeminent work from which study of the processes of
anthropomorphism of robotic agents began. See Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 7.
32. The names for these theories are adopted from the work of Jaeger and Levin. See
Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 4.
33. See id. at 6-9 (discussing the underlying research for both theories). Compare Epley
et al., supra note 25, at 868 (arguing that assignment of agency is an automatic process in which
humans engage), with Daniel T. Levin et al., Tests of Concepts About Different Kinds of Minds:
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. [Vol. 20:4:1181
model in an attempt to tie the discrepancies of these two accounts
together.34 The transition model does this by expounding upon what
Jaeger and Levin term first-line processing and second-line
conceptualization.35  First-line processing seeks to explain what
factors lead individuals to be more or less likely to make initial
assignments of agency,36 whereas second-line conceptualization
attempts to explain when attributions of agency will apply more
broadly on a categorical basis as opposed to an individual one.37 The
transition model ties these processes together through its "transitional
elements," which seek to identify when an individual will transition
from first-line processing to second-line conceptualization.38 In terms
of the model, this means that the individual transitions from
assigning agency to the particular nonhuman agent before him or her
to making such assignments to a wider array of nonhuman agents
beyond those being currently observed.39 Regardless of which theory
is a true and accurate representation of how people assign agency to
inanimate objects, the research consistently demonstrates that the
phenomenon exists and has the potential to greatly affect the way
humans interact with technology.40 To fully understand how and why
the assignment of agency will have such a profound impact on virtual
Predictions About the Behavior of Computers, Robots, and People, 28 J. HUM.-ROBOT
INTERACTION 161, 187 (2012) (suggesting that assignment of agency is enhanced after a subject
puts more thought into a robot's apparent goal orientation).
34. Daniel T. Levin et al., A Transition Model for Cognitions About Agency, in 8TH
ACM/IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN-ROBOT INTERACTION 373, 376-78 (2013).
35. See Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 11-14. The researchers who developed the
transition model also used the terms "first-line default reasoning" and "first-line defaults" to
refer to the first element of the model. See Levin et al., supra note 34, at 377. The difference is
immaterial to applying the theory; thus, this Note uses the terms from the most recent research
for simplicity's sake.
36. Levin et al., supra note 34, at 377. The processes within this first-line category are
the researchers' attempt to reconcile the discrepancies between the promiscuous and selective
agency accounts in terms of initial attributions of agency. Rather than asserting that such
attributions are innate (promiscuous account) or require a specific trigger (selective account),
they posit that certain factors make individuals either more likely to automatically assign
agency or more likely to avoid making such assignments. Id. at 376-78. Essentially, the
transition model asserts an individualistic framework for assignment of agency rather than the
broad, humanity-wide assertions of. the promiscuous and selective agency accounts. Jaeger &
Levin, supra note 30, at 10-11 ("Neither account needs to provide a universal explanation of
attributions of agency. Rather, it may be that each account accurately describes the process of
attribution in distinct contexts . . . .").
37. See Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 12.
38. Id. at 11-13.
39. See infra Part I.A.3.




assistants like Alexa, it is necessary to fully explain each theory and
the underlying mental processes that support each of them.
1. Promiscuous Agency Account
The preeminent theory about the assignment of agency to
nonhuman beings-robots or other forms of technology-is the
promiscuous agency account, as developed by Epley et al.4 1  This
theory proposes that humans have an innate knowledge of themselves
as beings that leads to their understanding of what it means to be goal
oriented.4 2 They then apply this knowledge to all other beings that
appear to be goal oriented.4 3 This self-knowledge encompasses what
the individual knows of human characteristics and is the basis for his
or her understanding of what it means to be human.4 4  In terms of
anthropomorphism, this "self-knowledge . . . functions as the known
and often readily accessible base for induction about the properties of
unknown agents."4 5 In other words, humans believe new agents think
the same way they do because they only experience their own
individualized thought processes.4 6 Humans recognize other humans
and organic beings as having the agency to make decisions by
observing the characteristics that conform to the self-understanding of
being a goal-oriented being.47 The promiscuous account posits that
the same attribution of agency humans apply to other organic agents
applies automatically to nonhuman agents that exhibit similar
behaviors.4 8 Scholars consider this a misattribution of agency because
the robot, in fact, does not act of its own accord and therefore is not a
41. Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 7; see Epley et al., supra note 25, at 865.
42. Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 7.
43. See Epley et al., supra note 25, at 865.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 866; see also Eyssel et al., supra note 19, at 852 ("[Pleople are likely to
anthropomorphize an unfamiliar entity because knowledge structures related either to
themselves or the broader category of 'humans' becomes activated and accessible. These
schemata, in turn, guide subsequent information processing and agent-related judgments.").
46. See Epley et al., supra note 25, at 865.
47. Epley et al. explain that the innate knowledge described above frequently results in
anthropomorphism for three basic reasons: (1) "simple physical constraints mean that humans
have direct and immediate access to the phenomenological experience of being a human but do
not have such immediate access to the phenomenological experience of any nonhuman agent"; (2)
"watching another agent's action appears to activate a phenomenological experience directly
consistent with the agent's action, providing a default that is likely to guide subsequent
reasoning about that agent"; and (3) "newborn infants are notorious in their need for intensive
care giving . . . by other humans[,] . . . [making] [t]he social life of infants . . . dominated by
exposure to and contact with other humans." Id. at 868.
48. Id.
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goal-oriented being.49 These misattributions of agency are not without
limitations. Scholars point out three categories of knowledge that will
help individuals correct such misattributions: elicited agent
knowledge, effectance, and sociality.50
Elicited agent knowledge refers to "knowledge about relevant
nonhuman agents."51 According to Jaeger and Levin, for example, "if
you . . . interact[] with a robot . . . [while] hav[ing] substantial
knowledge about how robots operate[,] . . . you are more likely to
correct your bias toward anthropomorphism."52  One gains this
knowledge by acquiring an understanding of how nonhuman agents
work.53 The better the understanding of the underlying processes of
the nonhuman agent, the more likely the individual will be able to
correct his or her misattributions of agency.54 Epley et al. explain that
"as knowledge about nonhuman agents is acquired, however,
knowledge about humans or the self should be less likely to be used as
a basis for induction simply because of the coactivation . . . of alternate
knowledge structures at the time of judgment."55 In other words, as
an individual gains more knowledge about the nonhuman agent, he or
she will be less likely to rely on self-knowledge to explain how and
why the agent is behaving in the perceived way. Thus, the degree of
availability of this knowledge to the individual correlates directly to
its effect on attribution of agency.56
Effectance and sociality are motivational mechanisms that
theoretically work in concert with elicited agent knowledge to affect
the automatic assignment of agency.57 Effectance is "the need to
interact effectively with one's environment."55  Scholars also describe
49. Karolina Zawieska et al., Understanding Anthropomorphisation i Social Robotics,
POMIARY AUTOMATYKA ROBOTYKA, Nov. 2012, at 78, 79 ("To project human characteristics onto
robots means to attribute qualities that robots do not have (to make attributions which are not
only unproven but also unlikely, i.e. to misattribute human traits)." (emphasis in original)
(citation omitted)).
50. See Epley et al., supra note 25, at 866; Zawieska et al., supra note 49, at 78.
51. Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 7.
52. Id.
53. Epley et al., supra note 25, at 866.
54. See id.; see also Eyssel et al., supra note 19, at 852 (changing the voice of a social
robot between male and female-an act of eliciting specific agent knowledge-to have
perceivable effects on participants' perceptions of competence and compassion of said robot).
55. Epley et al., supra note 25, at 866.
56. See id. ("[A]ctivation of alternate knowledge structures will then influence the
application of accessible knowledge to a given target either through a process of correction to
incorporate competing knowledge or through an integration of accessible knowledge . . .
57. See id.
58. Id. (citations omitted); see also Adam Waytz et al., Making Sense by Making
Sentient: Effectance Motivation Increases Anthropomorphism, 99 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
1190 [Vol. 20:4:1181
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effectance as "motivation to . . . reduce uncertainty about[] one's
environment and in one's interactions with other agents in it."59 In
terms of anthropomorphism, effectance refers to the attempt by
humans to explain the actions they see nonhuman agents
performing.60 As Jaeger and Levin analogize, "if you encounter a
machine that is particularly unpredictable or particularly threatening,
you will be less likely to correct your bias toward
anthropomorphism."61 This would lead one to be "more likely to
anthropomorphize the machine."62 Thus, one would find it easier to
correct misattributions of agency "if the machine [was] predictable or
non-threatening."63 In sum, predictable agents are easier to stop
anthropomorphizing, whereas unpredictable agents are more
challenging.
Sociality "describes the need and desire to establish social
connections with other humans."64 The action of assigning, agency as
an aspect of "[a]nthropomorphism may operate as an attempt to
satisfy this [desire] by representing nonhuman agents as sources of
humanlike social connection."65  Research has demonstrated that
"experimentally inducing loneliness increases belief in commonly
anthropomorphized supernatural agents (e.g., God) and leads people
to describe their pets as more humanlike."66 Applied in this context,
sociality posits that people with fewer social connections are more
likely to make attributions of agency; conversely, a strong social
network makes attributions less likely or more easily correctable.67
2. Selective Agency Account
Researchers developed the selective agency account after
noticing underlying research about attributions of agency that not
only failed to support but directly contradicted the promiscuous
agency account.68 Specifically, research shows that humans "draw
PSYCHOL. 410, 412 (2010) (defining effectance as "the basic motivation to be an effective and
competent social agent . . . ." (citations omitted)).
59. Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 7.
60. Epley et al., supra note 25, at 866.
61. Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 7.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Epley et al., supra note 25, at 866.
65. Waytz et al., supra note 58, at 412.
66. Id. (citation omitted).
67. See id.; see also Epley et al., supra note 25, at 866.
68. Jaeger and Levin describe two sets of conflicting findings as to whether adults
strongly distinguish between computers and people in terms of their ability to act deliberately.
11912018]
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sharp distinctions between living and nonliving agents."69 In contrast,
the promiscuous agency account's presumption of applying
self-knowledge to nonhuman agents is premised on the idea that such
sharp distinctions are not drawn.70 As such, researchers concluded
that rather than assigning agency in a promiscuous manner, there are
instances where the individual will selectively assign agency instead.7 1
To reach these conclusions, the researchers conducted several
experiments discussed below.
In one set of experiments, researchers placed participants into
groups where either a human or robot-computer actor would pick up
various objects on a grid.72 They told participants that in trials one
and two of a three-trial sequence, the actor picked up a specific
object-a duck-from the same spot within a grid.73 During the third
trial, however, the researchers switched the duck to another spot on
the grid while placing a new object in the duck's old position on the
grid.74 They then asked participants whether they believed the actor
would pick up the duck or pick up the new object that now occupied
the duck's previous position.7 5  The researchers noted that
"participants consistently made significantly fewer 'intentional'
predictions . . . for the [robot-]computer than for the human."76 In the
context of this experiment, a prediction that the robot would act with
intention would be to predict that the robot would pick up the duck
rather than the new object.7 7 Rather than automatically assuming
that the robot acted in an intentional way-an outcome that the
promiscuous agency account would predict-the participants were
reluctant to assign agency to the robot.7 8
See Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 8-10; see also id. at 10 ("[T]his pattern of findings supports
precisely the opposite of the promiscuous agency account . . .
69. See id. at 8 (citations omitted).
70. See id. at 7; see also Epley et al., supra note 25, at 868 (describing what is believed to
be a natural inclination to apply Theory of Mind to nonhuman agents imply because they
behave similarly to the observing human).
71. See Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 10.
72. See id. at 8.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 8 fig. 1.
75. See id. at 8.
76. Id. (citation omitted).
77. See Daniel T. Levin et al., Concepts About the Capabilities of Computers and Robots:
A Test of the Scope of Adults' Theory of Mind, in 3RD ACM/IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON HUMAN-ROBOT INTERACTION 57, 58 (2008) ("[I]f subjects are treating the behavior in a goal-
directed fashion, they should predict that the entity will retain the same goal on the third trial,
and pick up the duck again.").
78. See Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 8.
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Another experiment focused on the necessary manipulations
that would elicit an assignment of agency to a nonhuman agent. The
experimental manipulations were the researchers' active and overt
attempts to force an attribution of agency from the test subject.7 9
Levin et al. showed participants recordings of a robot named "OSCAR"
interacting with humans by letting them cross the street in front of
"him" and then asked the participants specifically to remember
OSCAR's "preferences" when selecting certain items.80  The
researchers found that both of these manipulations were necessary to
induce assignment of agency as either individually failed to do so.8 1
They concluded that these results demonstrated humans are reluctant
to assign agency to nonhuman objects, which directly conflicts with
the promiscuous agency account.82 The study further noted that
assignment of agency is actually more likely to occur after repeated
interactions with a robot rather than upon the initial interaction.83
3. Transition Model
The seemingly contradictory conclusions that the promiscuous
and selective agency accounts posit may not be evidence that either is
wrong but rather that factors outside of those considered in both
theories control whether agency is initially attributed to a nonhuman
agent.8 4 This thought led researchers to develop the transition model,
which attempts to reconcile both aforementioned theories.8 5 This
model has three aspects that explain if and when an individual will
attribute agency to a nonhuman agent: (1) first-line processing, (2)
second-line conceptualization, and (3) the titular transitional
79. Levin et al., supra note 77, at 59.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 59, 62-63.
83. Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 10 ("[R]epeatedly viewing a robot look at one of
two objects led participants to attribute more agency to the robot.").
84. See id. at 11.
85. See id. ("A key empirical observation that the transition model is designed to
accommodate is that people sometimes default to promiscuous inductions about agency and then
pare back upon further consideration, but they also sometimes start with a selective attributions
[sic] and only broaden their attributions after further consideration.").
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elements.86 The first two aspects actually determine whether an
assignment of agency will occur.87
First-line defaults and processes include four
elements-theorized to balance against each other-which lead to
either an initial attribution of agency or not. These four elements are
(1) perceptual detection and classification, (2) basic agency and
reference, (3) first-line knowledge activation, and (4) local givens.88
Perceptual detection and classification refers to how an individual
views a nonhuman agent: if the agent has an outward appearance that
causes the observer to associate it with an organic agent, this factor
will balance in favor of an initial attribution of agency.89 Basic agency
and reference refers to an individual's ability to detect "self-initiated
behavior, movement patterns, and anthropomorphic physical features
such as faces and eyes."90 Naturally, nonhuman agents that exhibit
more of these anthropomorphic features will more easily be
anthropomorphized initially. First-line knowledge activation
encompasses the initial cognitive responses to agents, including the
basic heuristics humans use to determine how the observed agent
thinks.91 Lastly, local givens are the context-providing settings and
details that can affect behavior predictions.92
Second-line conceptualizations allow individuals to reform a
previously held belief they feel the need to correct by appealing to
deep principles, modifications of classification, entailments, domain
theory, or reconceptualization of defaults.93  When an individual
86. The term "transitional elements" is adopted to simplify discussing the means by
which researchers have studied the ways that transitions from first-line processing to
second-line conceptualizations occur, which the researchers have described as either cognitive
dissonance or the availability/accessibility of second-line concepts or deep concept availability.
See Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 11; Levin et al., supra note 34, at 377.
87. Daniel T. Levin, Megan M. Saylor & Simon D. Lynn, Distinguishing First-Line
Defaults and Second-Line Conceptualization in Reasoning About Humans, Robots, and
Computers, 70 INT'L J. HUM.-COMPUTER STUD. 527, 529 (2012) ("The idea of two modes of
reasoning is a generalization of models of [Theory of Mind] which specify an initial, automatic
agency-detection/belief inference stage of processing, and a later, controlled conceptual stage that
does the more difficult job of tracking situations where belief and the world do not align."
(citations omitted)).
88. See Levin et al., supra note 34, at 377 & fig.2.
89. Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 12.
90. See Levin et al., supra note 34, at 377.
91. See id. ("First-line knowledge activation is meant to encompass the initial cognitive
responses to agents. This includes basic heuristics about the kind of thinking an agent typically
engages in . . . and the results of default problem-solving strategies.").
92. See id. ("[L]ocal givens constitute details and contingencies about the current setting
that enter into behavior predictions.").
93. See id. & fig.2. Jaeger and Levin explain that deep principles are such things as
"abstract formal relationships that hold across many situations . . . . [T]his can be seen as
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undergoes a second-line conceptualization, he or she makes some kind
of generalization to agents beyond the specific robot or technology
observed.94 One's ability to produce these generalizations affects the
likelihood one will assign agency to robots that are similar to the robot
inducing such a transition.95
A transitional element usually triggers a move from first-line
to second-line processes.96 The two primary transitional elements
identified in relevant research are cognitive dissonance and the
availability or accessibility of second-line concepts.97  Cognitive
dissonance occurs when an individual's observations do not conform to
the individual's previously held belief.98  The ability to react to
cognitive dissonance by shifting one's cognitive framework leads to
second-line conceptualizations, particularly a reconceptualization of
previously held default beliefs.99 This is the means by which the
transition model incorporates elements of both the promiscuous and
the selective agency accounts.100 It accommodates both individuals
who initially assign agency and then undergo a cognitive process to
correct it, as in the promiscuous agency account, and individuals
initially reluctant to assign agency but who undergo a cognitive
upheaval to begin assigning agency, as predicted by the selective
agency account.101  Courts have yet to consider this process in
determining applicable legal doctrines to machines and instead focus
on their functionality. In the case of Alexa, this functionality is to
convey to Amazon information contained within its users' requests
and demands, after which Amazon stores that information.102
processing the schematic structure of a problem as opposed to its surface structure." Jaeger &
Levin, supra note 30, at 12. Modifications of classifications "reflect[] the collections of ways in
which a working-memory representation of an agent can be modified[,] . . . involv[ing] changes to
the classification of an agent . .. or changes to the entailments of the classification." Id. at 12.
Further, domain theory "propose[s] that individuals acquire moral concepts about fairness,
others' welfare, and rights ... beginning in early childhood, and this knowledge develops during
childhood and adolescence." 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 279
(William A. Darity, Jr. ed., 2d ed. 2008).
94. See Levin et al., supra note 34, at 377.
95. See Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 18.
96. See Levin et al., supra note 34, at 377.
97. See id. at 378.
98. See id. at 377.
99. See Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 13.
100. See id. at 11.
101. See id. at 7, 10.
102. Baguley & McDonald, supra note 7.
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B. Legal Doctrines Currently Applied to Information Voluntarily
Conveyed to Third Parties
When the government attempts to obtain something from an
individual-whether that something is tangible or intangible-the
government's action is most often considered a seizure that triggers
Fourth Amendment analysis.103 When the information sought by the
government is transferred from the suspect party to a third party,
courts often apply a doctrine of Fourth Amendment analysis known as
the third-party doctrine. The Supreme Court developed the doctrine,
which is grounded in the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test first
introduced by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Katz v. United
States,10 4 through two cases: United States v. Miller1 05 and Smith v.
Maryland.106 In short, the third-party doctrine states "that a person
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
turns over to third parties."107
With respect to the third-party doctrine analysis, the Smith
Court considered whether collecting incriminating phone records
absent a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.10 8 In determining
what, if any, expectation of privacy the defendant had, the Court
stated it "doubt[ed] that people in general entertain any actual
expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial."109 Expounding
further, the Court stated, "[a]ll telephone users realize that they must
'convey' phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through
telephone company switching equipment that their calls are
completed."110 Thus, the Court determined that the "voluntariness"
prong of the third-party doctrine was satisfied because of the
assumption that individuals are generally aware that third parties
keep their records and yet continue to convey information to them
despite this assumed knowledge.1 1' The assumptions being made by
the Court confirm that actual, subjective knowledge about the
103. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ("[W]e have expressly held that
the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the
recording of oral statements.").
104. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
105. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
106. Smith, 442 U.S. at 735.
107. Id. at 743-44.
108. See id. at 737. Police officers obtained these records after the phone company
installed a pen register-which "is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a
telephone"-at their request. Id. at 737 & n. 1 (internal quotations omitted).
109. Id. at 742.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 743.
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possibility of disclosure is not required by the party whose records are
sought.112
In cases beyond Smith, courts applied the doctrine to "(1) bank
records, (2) credit card statements, (3) kilowatt consumption from
electric utility records, (4) motel registration records, (5) cell phone
records, and (6) employment records."113 Continued application of the
third-party doctrine created a binary distinction through which
information is categorized as either wholly private and secret or
completely disclosed to the entire world.114 Some argue that this
binary implementation is an inappropriate anachronism in a
technologically advancing society.11 5 Currently, one Justice on the
Supreme Court seems to echo this sentiment: Justice Sotomayor wrote
in her concurrence in United States v. Jones that "it may be necessary
to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties."11 6
At the time of this writing, the Supreme Court is considering a
potentially impactful case, Carpenter v. United States.1 17 This case
presents the possibility of limiting the expansive and binary nature of
the third-party doctrine." Several amici curiae argue that the
third-party doctrine should either be wholly eliminated or limited in
application to the information at issue in a specific case.119 Each
amicus brief relies in some part upon Justice Sotomayor's concurrence
in Jones, questioning the doctrine's continued applicability in the
digital age.120 Should Justice Sotomayor-the sole member of the
112. Id. ("Although subjective expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much
to believe that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any general expectation
that the numbers they dial will remain secret.").
113. United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156, at
*8 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008) (citations omitted) (collecting cases).
114. See If These Walls Could Talk, supra note 12, at 1931.
115. See, e.g., id. at 1933; Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 19, Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402 (argued Nov. 29, 2017), 2017
WL 4512266, at *19.
116. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
117. See United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct.
2211 (2017). The issue before the Court in this case is specifically related to whether the Fourth
Amendment provides protection against the warrantless seizure of historical cellphone records
from the cell service provider, which reveal the location and movements of a cellphone user. See
Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al., supra note 115, at 2.
118. See Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al., supra note 115, at 2.
119. See Brief for Data & Society Research Institute et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 6-9, Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402 (argued Nov. 29, 2017), 2017 WL
3530957, at *6-9; Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al., supra note 115, at 3.
120. Brief for Data & Society Research Institute et al., supra note 119, at 7; Brief for
Electronic Frontier Foundation et al., supra note 115, at 19.
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Court to openly express her view that the doctrine is an
anachronism-be able to convince more members of the Court to join
her, it could spell the end of the third-party doctrine, but the fate of
the doctrine remains to be seen.12 1
II. ANALYSIS
The incorporation of virtual assistants makes smart-home
technology more susceptible to an assignment of agency than ever.
Because there is now an actual humanlike interaction with the virtual
assistant,122 application of the agency assignment heories leads to the
conclusion that users perceive such virtual assistants as exhibiting
agency.123 Smart-home technology is rapidly evolving as companies
continue working on improvements to make virtual assistants more
lifelike. 124 As such, it is appropriate to examine what effects this
technological advancement will have and what form it will likely
take.125
There are two primary factors that will likely lead to even more
assignment of agency to virtual assistant technology: (1)
advancements in Al and (2) the effect that exposure to virtual
assistants has on a child's perceptions of technology.126  A
compounding factor is that the prevalence of such technology carries
clear implications for privacy considerations within the home.127
Thus, it is appropriate to discuss what legal doctrines will have the
most impact on the recordings created and stored by virtual assistants
and how easily the government can access them.
121. While the Court has changed composition slightly since Jones was decided-Justice
Scalia, the author of the Jones opinion, has been replaced by Justice Neil Gorsuch-it seems
unlikely that this will provide any difference in opinion because Justice Gorsuch has shown a
willingness to abide by the third-party doctrine. See Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1184-85
(10th Cir. 2011) (noting that the existence of debate about the applicability of the third-party
doctrine to medical records was all that was necessary to conclude that law enforcement seeking
such records without a warrant did not clearly violate the law).
122. Rory Carroll, Goodbye Privacy, Hello 'Alexa': Amazon Echo, the Home Robot Who
Hears It All, GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2015, 7:07 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2015/nov/21/amazon-echo-alexa-home-robot-privacy-cloud [https://perma.cc/FKC9-EPAR].
123. See supra Part I.A.
124. See Ben Fox Rubin, Alexa, Be More Human: Inside Amazon's Effort to Make Its Voice
Assistant Smarter, Chattier and More Like You, CNET (Aug. 29, 2017),
https://www.cnet.com/html/feature/amazon-alexa-echo-inside-look/ [https://perma.cc/ZV53-
CAA7].
125. See infra Part II.B.
126. See infra Part II.B.
127. See Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 15.
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A. Anthropomorphism Applied to the Virtual Assistants Incorporated
in Smart-Home Technology
An initial question is whether the agency assignment and
anthropomorphism research discussed above can be appropriately
applied to the virtual assistants accompanying smart-home
technology. While current anthropomorphism and agency assignment
research has focused primarily on robots,128 its application extends
beyond robotics because the literature specifically refers to the
broader category of nonhuman agents.129 Alexa and other virtual
assistants fall within this category of nonhuman agents because they
exhibit conversational capacity, which is a humanlike
characteristic.13 0  The ability to hold a conversation, or at least
respond lucidly with a voice to a request, is one of the clearest
examples of a humanlike characteristic that can invoke
anthropomorphism.131 Thus, it is appropriate to analyze how virtual
assistants will be subjected to assigned agency under the theories this
Note examines.132
As discussed above, the promiscuous agency account almost
certainly indicates that users assign agency to virtual assistants.133
The theory assumes that humans will naturally assign agency to a
virtual assistant like Alexa due to its humanlike characteristics and
would have to acquire specific knowledge to correct that
assumption.134 For elicited agent knowledge to decrease the likelihood
of an assignment of agency, the user must obtain specific knowledge
about the virtual assistant's underlying hardware or software.135 This
is unlikely, as the complexity of both the hardware and software
128. Levin et al., supra note 77, at 57 ("Previous research has explored how subjects
attribute specific knowledge to intelligent artifacts such as robots, and how people are more
likely to interact with robots that produce social cues." (footnotes omitted)).
129. See, e.g., Epley et al., supra note 25, at 895 ("These nonhuman agents may include
anything that acts with apparent independence, including nonhuman animals, natural forces,
religious deities, and mechanical or electronic devices." (emphasis added)).
130. Zawieska et al., supra note 49, at 78 ("[A]nthropomorphisation in social robotics is
usually understood as the human tendency to perceive robots as humanlike in response to visual,
audio and/or tactile stimuli provided by robots." (emphasis added)).
131. See James R. Hurford, Human Uniqueness, Learned Symbols and Recursive
Thought, 12 EUR. REV. 551, 552-53 (2004).
132. See supra Part I.A.
133. See supra Part I.A. 1.
134. See supra Part I.A. 1.
135. See Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 7 ("[I]f you are interacting with a robot, and
you happen to have substantial knowledge about how robots operate[,] . . . you are more likely to
correct your bias toward anthropomorphism.").
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continues to increase as innovators implement new technology.13 6 A
major factor here is whether the agent appears human enough to
trigger an assignment of the user's underlying self-knowledge-the
fundamental premise of the promiscuous agency account.137 This is
less important, however, when the user's underlying knowledge about
the agent is insufficient to correct for anthropomorphism.13 8 The fact
that these virtual assistants respond with a humanlike voice may help
prevent triggering agency knowledge that would be expected to
maintain the misattribution of agency through continual invocation of
the user's self-knowledge.1 39 Effectance is likely to weigh against
attributions of agency, however, because the virtual assistant
responds in a particular way to requests by design. This predictability
leads to corrections of misattribution,140 but a sufficient number of
random or alternative responses might be enough to counter such
corrections. Sociality will be very difficult to apply to virtual assistant
technology; even if it were easily applied, its effect would be incredibly
individualistic. As individuals grow increasingly accustomed to online
interactions, they may be more willing to accept the interactions
between themselves and responsive robots as social interactions. As
such, individuals may begin to seek out social interaction from these
social robots, thus becoming more likely to assign agency to such
forms of technology.
The selective agency account, while not suggesting automatic
assignment of agency to virtual assistants, would likely still conclude
that people assign agency to smart-home technology. According to the
selective agency account, the key feature affecting whether one
assigns agency to a robot is the sufficiency of the manipulation to
assign agency.14 1 Circumstances that manipulate one to assign agency
include viewing the robot behaving in a way that humans
behave-such as crossing the street and stopping to allow others to
pass in front of it-and receiving instructions to remember the robot's
apparent cognitive choices.142 Despite being unable to physically
136. See Baguley & McDonald, supra note 7.
137. See Epley et al., supra note 25, at 869.
138. See id. at 878 ("[O1ur account . . . predicts that those without sufficient time or
cognitive resources to engage in effortful correction will show stronger evidence of
anthropomorphism than those given more time or ability to engage in more effortful thought.").
139. See id.
140. Cf. Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 7 ("[T]he 'promiscuous agency account' .
posits that, when confronted with an unknown or unpredictable stimulus, people default to
anthropomorphizing it." (emphasis added)).
141. See id. at 9.
142. See id. (noting that participants made predications of robots having intentional
behaviors when they were asked specifically to remember the objects that the robot "preferred").
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perform any actions, both of these manipulations can be present in
virtual assistants through specific wording in the instructions
packaged with the technology and continuous exposure to humanlike
responses, as explained below.
While it would be impossible for Alexa to walk across the street
or behave in some outwardly visible, humanlike way, its interactions
with users may be sufficient to elicit humanoid quality
determinations. Alexa responds in a way that an individual could
interpret as facilitating conversation-a distinctly human quality.14 3
The ability to have a conversation with Alexa may have an incredibly
powerful manipulating effect.
One could analogize a conversation with Alexa to a traditional
phone conversation. While a technological device-either Alexa's
accompanying hardware, the Amazon Echo, or a phone-is clearly
separating the parties and facilitating their ability to converse, the
user is not limited to assigning agency only to the hardware in front of
him or her.144 Rather, in both instances the hardware-the Echo and
the phone-is only a means to communicate with the subject to which
the individual actually assigns agency. Agency is attributed to the
person on the other end of the phone, while the phone facilitates the
communication. Similarly, agency is attributed to Alexa itself, while
the Echo device merely transmits the communication.
Specific manipulation could also arise from being told to treat
Alexa as a person rather than a robot. The instructions that
accompanying the Amazon Echo may provide sufficient manipulation
if they instruct users to interact with Alexa as if it were a person45 in
order to make the technology most effective. This instruction, in
conjunction with the conversational way that interactions occur with
Alexa, may be sufficiently similar to the manipulation exemplified in
the research described by Jaeger and Levin above.146  Research
demonstrated that such manipulation was sufficient to elicit
143. See Hurford, supra note 131, at 152; see also Carroll, supra note 122 (describing his
personal experience of having an instinctual desire to placate Alexa when he perceived to have
offended her).
144. Anthropomorphism and assignment of agency attach to nonhuman agents that
exhibit humanlike characteristics as explained above. See supra Part I.A. In this context, it is not
the hardware itself but rather the individual on the other end of the phone call who exhibits
"humanlike" characteristics. In regard to the Echo, it is Alexa, the virtual assistant, that is
exhibiting the humanlike characteristics, rather than the hardware itself.
145. See Meet Alexa, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/meet-alexa/
b?ie=UTF8&node=16067214011 [https://perma.cclWR4S-8JM5] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
Amazon's own website introducing Alexa invites viewers of the webpage to "meet Alexa" and
details various skills that Alexa can do or learn. Id.
146. See Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 11.
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assignment of agency among participants; thus, those subjected to the
priming described above would likely assign Alexa agency as well. 14 7
Further, researchers advocating for the selective agency
account note that when humans repeatedly view a robot behaving in a
goal-oriented way, they attribute agency to that robot at a higher
rate.148 Thus, repeatedly engaging with Alexa, as would likely happen
naturally over time, may be sufficient to establish the assignment of
agency.
Since both the promiscuous and selective agency accounts
would likely be individually sufficient to elicit assignment of agency
for Alexa, the transition model also supports the conclusion that Alexa
will be the subject of agency assignment.14 9 The communications
Alexa requires of its users likely satisfy the perceptual first-line
processing of the model. Users must speak and make requests as if
they are talking to another person. Indeed, users engage Alexa by
saying its name, thus facilitating the perception of a conversation with
an intelligent being rather than a simple request to a robot.150
Further, the transition model literature specifically uses this kind of
interaction to exemplify what could lead to a first-line Theory of Mind
default cognition that would attribute agency to such technology.15 1
Notably, first-line processing would result in assignment of agency on
a limited scale applicable only to the robot in front of the individual.
However, there are similar transitional functions available that could
lead to second-line processes allowing for broader assignment of
agency.152  One such transitional function is the "deep concept
availability,"15 3 which is similar to the manipulation examples
explained above in regard to the selective agency account.154
147. See id.
148. See id. at 10.
149. See id. at 11.
150. See Baguley & McDonald, supra note 7.
151. See Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 12 ("[C]arrying on a conversation about politics
with a computer will likely invite more first-line attributions of agency than would typing a
paper in Word on the same computer.").
152. Levin et al., supra note 34, at 377.
153. Levin et al. describe deep concept availability as
the current availability of the second-line concepts [that] facilitate transitions. This
idea is based both on Epley et al.'s idea of elicited agent knowledge and on
developmental research demonstrating that inductions based on the broad living-
nonliving distinction . . . require that children be reminded of the status of specific
things as living or nonliving.
Id. at 378 (footnote omitted).
154. Id. at 377 fig.2, 378; see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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B. A Forward-Looking Approach to Smart-Home Technology and Its
Virtual Assistants
Two primary aspects of technological advancement are relevant
when considering smart-home technology: (1) the rate at which
technology can expand and (2) the increased exposure to this kind of
technology at an earlier age in technologically advanced societies.155
Moore's Law, or the law of exponential growth, illustrates the
availability of technological advancement and the timeframe in which
that advancement can be expected to occur.156 While it is impossible
to predict with any certainty when a specific technological
advancement will occur, predictions about the potential effects of
advancements may be easier to chart.157 Advancements in Al stand to
make the greatest impact on smart-home technology.158 While the
legal implications of Al exceed the scope of this Note,159 the near
certainty of impending expansive incorporation of Al to improve both
the efficiency and user experience of virtual assistants like Alexa
makes consideration of these topics even more pertinent.
The most pressing implication of AI advancement is that the
attribution of agency to virtual assistants may no longer be considered
a misattribution. The law as it now stands is ill-equipped to deal with
the possibility that Alexa could achieve true Al-or even
sentience160-which has already led other researchers to argue for the
creation of rights for social robots.161 As the technology advances and
155. See Jim Taylor, How Technology Is Changing the Way Children Think and Focus,
PSYCHOL. TODAY (Dec. 4, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-power-
prime/201212/how-technology-is-changing-the-way-children-think-and-focus
[https://perma.cc/QBL6-FBGG].
156. See Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits, 38
ELECTRONICS 114-15 (1965). But see Michael Guihot, Anne F. Matthew & Nicolas P. Suzor,
Nudging Robots: Innovative Solutions to Regulate Artificial Intelligence, 20 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 385, 404 n.82 (2017) (discussing research that suggests Moore's predictions about rapid
expansion of computing power may finally be at an end).
157. See Opinion, 14 Predictions for the Future of Smart Home Technology, FORBES (Jan.
12, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/01/12/14-predictions-for-
the-future-of-smart-home-technology/#62 1a28532e21.
158. See Guihot, Matthew & Suzor, supra note 156, at 395 (discussing that a broad
definition of Al encompasses the personal assistants developed by various companies-which
would include Amazon).
159. For an overview of potential regulatory solutions to the burgeoning issue of Al
advancement, see id. at 418-54.
160. See Sentient, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (defining sentience
as the ability "to perceive or feel things").
161. For an overview of the arguments in favor, see Kate Darling, Extending Legal
Protection to Social Robots: The Effects of Anthropomorphism, Empathy, and Violent Behavior
Towards Robotic Objects, in ROBOT LAW 213 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016). See also Kahn et al.,
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advanced interactive technologies move beyond being inanimate,162 it
will only become clearer that a gap in the law exists.
Another implication that research has yet to address is how
growing up in a world of pervasive smart-home technology affects
children's propensity to anthropomorphize and assign agency to such
technology. One theory, proffered by Epley et al., assumes a base
"human" intelligence that people can innately access and thus use to
make intuitions about agency.163 Other research notes that children
are more likely than adults to anthropomorphize or make attributions
of agency to technology.164 Children exposed to this kind of technology
at a young age may develop distinct human knowledge that
incorporates the existence of smart-home technology by default.165
Thus, children may be more likely to anthropomorphize and make
assignments of agency to technology when they become adults.
C. Results of Steadfast Application of the Third-Party Doctrine to
Smart-Home Technology
As noted above, courts apply the third-party doctrine in several
situations but have yet to apply the doctrine specifically to
smart-home technology with an accompanying virtual assistant.166 As
of September 2017, only one court has faced the possibility of applying
this doctrine to Alexa, but prior to its ruling on the matter, the
accused-and owner of the Echo in question-consented to turning
over the recordings voluntarily, thus mooting the issue.167 Despite the
lack of clear precedent, adoption of the third-party doctrine is likely in
this context due to the parallels between Alexa's functionality and the
technologies to which the doctrine is already applicable.168 In Alexa's
case, the smart-home technology records user requests made after the
supra note 1, at 159-60. To the Author's knowledge, however, no such argument for robotic
rights has been accepted by any legislature or brought before a court.
162. Kahn et al., supra note 1, at 160.
163. Epley et al., supra note 25, at 865.
164. Kahn et al., supra note 1, at 159-60; see Epley et al., supra note 25, at 865.
165. This could have a particularly drastic impact on the promiscuous agency account due
to its base assumption regarding how the individual views his or her own self-knowledge when
being exposed to a new agent. See Epley et al., supra note 25, at 865.
166. See supra Part I.B.
167. McLaughlin, supra note 14. See generally Stipulation and Consent Order, State v.
Bates, No. CR-2016-370-2 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Mar. 6, 2017), https://caseinfo.aoc.arkansas.gov/
cconnect/PROD/public/ckpublic-qry-doct.cp-dktrpt-frames?backto=P&case-id=04CR-16-
370&begindate=&enddate= [https://perma.cc/FLU6-46R2].
168. See If These Walls Could Talk, supra note 12, at 1925 ("The doctrine has been used
to allow warrantless collection of email records, internet browsing data, and cell phone location
history, among others.").
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invocation of a wake word-"Alexa"-that the manufacturer of the
technology, Amazon, subsequently stores.169 The contract between the
manufacturer and the user is likely sufficient to establish
voluntariness, which is a necessary prerequisite for application of the
third-party doctrine.170 As such, applying the doctrine to Alexa's
stored recordings would result in the government only needing either
a subpoena or consent from the holder of the recordings, Amazon, to
access them,171 neither of which is a very high bar for the government
to pass.172  As such, the next time this question arises and the
defendant is unwilling to moot the issue through consent, the
third-party doctrine will likely become the applicable legal standard
for all recordings of the queries and requests made to Alexa. The
third-party doctrine is ultimately an inappropriate legal standard due
to technology's rapid pace of innovation coupled with potentially
expansive governmental access to intimate communications within the
home.
III. SOLUTION
To maintain the paramount level of privacy within the home1 73
despite the growing presence of ever-listening virtual assistants, this
Note suggests a multipart solution. First, either courts or Congress
should adopt some form of legal distinction that treats Alexa as a
person as a matter of law. To accomplish this, the Author suggests
169. Baguley & McDonald, supra note 7.
170. In the oral arguments for the Carpenter case currently being decided by the Supreme
Court this term, Justice Alito specifically referenced a contract between the parties that signified
the possibility of certain disclosures as signaling satisfaction of the voluntariness prong of the
third-party doctrine. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 16-17, Carpenter v. United States, No.
16-402 (argued Nov. 29, 2017).
171. See Kerr & Nojeim, supra note 15.
172. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 700 (1974), the Supreme Court noted that
the requirements for a subpoena to be issued are "(1) relevancy; (2) admissibility; [and] (3)
specificity." This is opposed to the more stringent requirements of obtaining a warrant. See Akhil
Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757, 779 (1994) ("At a
mimmum ... a lawful warrant can issue only from one duly authorized, and only if it meets the
explicit textual requirements of probable cause, oath, particular description, and so forth.").
173. The Fourth Amendment specifically protects citizens' houses from unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585
(1980) ("[T]he [Fourth] Amendment 'reache[s] farther than the concrete form' of the specific cases
that gave it birth, and 'appl[ies] to all invasions on the part of the government and its employds
of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."' (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886))); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 316-17 (1971) ("[O]ver the years the
Court consistently has been most protective of the privacy of the dwelling."); Camara v. Mun.
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) ("For instance, even the most law-abiding citizen has a very
tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity of his home may be
broken by official authority.").
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either that courts adopt an objective test to determine the categories
of technology to which this distinction shall apply or that Congress
enact some form of legislation also making use of an objective test. As
discussed above, adaptation of the law is becoming a necessity so that
the law can both keep up with how society actually views assistants
like Alexa and avoid the possibility of continuous application of
anachronistic doctrines that do not take into account society's
interconnectedness in the modern digital age.174 Second, this Part
posits that the adoption of legal personhood for Alexa is insufficient to
offer adequate privacy protections to "her" users because it simply
streamlines the Fourth Amendment analysis rather than enhancing
it. As such, this Part concludes by suggesting that courts should be
willing to create a new privilege between anthropomorphized virtual
assistants that are subjected to assignments of agency and their users.
A. Alexa and Other Virtual Assistants Should Be Considered "Persons"
When the legal implications of a technology's impact on one's
privacy interests are extreme, as is the case with smart-home
technology, "a thorough empirical account of attributions of agency
can, and should, play an important role in shaping law and policy
about intelligent technologies."'7 5  Research suggests a steadily
growing need for a new ontological category that encompasses
personified technology.176 The premise behind the necessity of this
new categorization is that developmental psychology research finds
that children do not view "whether an entity is alive . . . [as] a
necessary precondition . . . to attribute psychological states such as
cognition and emotion to [that entity]."177 Incorporating agency theory
into the law acknowledges the realities of our interactions with
technology while simultaneously preventing anachronisms from
developing by keeping the law current with further technological
innovation. As discussed above, virtual assistants are very likely to be
subjected to assignments of agency, which greatly impact how
individuals view the technology.78 Courts and legislatures should
consider the legal implications of virtual assistants subjected to
agency assignment, because users view such assistants as something
174. See supra Part II.
175. Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 4.
176. Kahn et al., supra note 1, at 159 ("Ontology refers to basic categories of being, and
ways of distinguishing them.").
177. Id.
178. See supra Part H.A.
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more than machines.'79 Further, the future advances that might
increase the assignment of agency to virtual assistant technology
reveal why such a distinction for the technology is needed sooner
rather than later.180
1. Common Law Reasonable Person Approach
Courts have the capacity to define how to treat virtual
assistant technology and should extend the term "person" to certain
technologies that are subjected to assignments of agency. By applying
research on "personified robots"-robots subjected to
anthropomorphism by users-courts can develop an objective standard
to distinguish this type of technology from others not necessitating
such a distinction.181 This research suggests that technology should be
considered under a new, distinctive category that asks whether a
reasonable person would experience and create a social and moral
connection to such a robot.182 Specifically, the research looks at how
people develop social and moral connections with personified
technology.183 The research criteria can provide an outline for a two-
prong reasonableness test regarding the relationship between the use
of the technology and the technology itself: one prong regarding
development of social connections, and the other regarding
development of moral connections. When applying this test, courts
should ask whether a reasonable person would develop social and
moral connections with the technology at issue.
The social connections experienced between user and virtual
assistant would likely fall closely in line with the agency assignment
effects discussed throughout this Note.184 Thus, when a reasonable
person would assign agency to a virtual assistant, the social
connection prong of the reasonableness test is satisfied.185 The test's
moral connections prong would require that the user experiences a
negative emotional reaction to the idea of "harming" the technology.186
179. Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 6.
180. See supra Part I.B.
181. See Kahn et al., supra note 1, at 160.
182. . Id.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., supra Part I.A.
185. See Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 16 (discussing various factors of nonhuman
agents that can lead to "reasonable attributions" of agency (emphasis added)); see also Kahn et
al., supra note 1, at 160.
186. This moral connections test is based loosely upon personified robot research.
Although the relevant research focuses specifically on the potential of inflicting physical harm
upon a social robot, harm can be more broadly defined to include verbal abuse or harassment
intended to cause emotional or mental damage. See Darling, supra note 161, at 216; see also
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Thus, the second prong is satisfied when a reasonable person would
have an instinctive negative emotional reaction to the idea of harming
the technology at issue.
Alexa is an example of a virtual assistant that likely satisfies
both prongs of this objective reasonableness test. Regardless of the
theory of agency assignment that is applied, users likely
anthropomorphize Alexa.187 Whether this is a natural tendency of
humans or sufficient priming exists to elicit such a response, a
reasonable person would anthropomorphize Alexa and other virtual
assistants, thus satisfying the social connection prong. The second
prong is satisfied, for example, by some of Alexa's programmed
responses when a user employs foul language in either a query or
demand.18s The response programmed by the developers is so effective
that it can elicit a feeling that Alexa deserves an apology for the user's
poor choice of language.189 Thus, a reasonable user would likely
experience both social and moral connections with Alexa, and the
technology would qualify as a "person" under the new distinction
created by the courts.
2. Alternative Approaches-Congress Changing the Dictionary Act
Definition of "Person," and Other Statutory Options
If courts fail to extend the term "person" to apply to virtual
assistant technology, it may then fall upon Congress to act. Within
the Dictionary Act, Congress codified a definition of "person," which
"include[s] corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships,
societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals."190 This
demonstrates Congress's willingness to consider things beyond an
individual human as a person.191  Congress could simply add
Waytz et al., supra note 58, at 425 ("[P]eople report that it is less acceptable to harm nonhuman
entities that they perceive to have minds. Individuals chronically high in the tendency to
anthropomorphize also judge harm committed toward a computer, a motorcycle, or even a bed of
flowers to be more morally reprehensible." (citations omitted)).
187. See supra Part I.A.
188. See Carroll, supra note 122 (explaining the author's urge to apologize to Alexa after
she chastised him upon mistaking something said as foul language).
189. Id.
190. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
191. "Congress updated the Dictionary Act most recently in 2002," which shows that
Congress is not unwilling to consider updates to either change definitions or add new ones when
the political pressure exists. See Emily J. Barnet, Hobby Lobby and the Dictionary Act, 124
YALE L.J.F. 11, 12 n.6 (2014). The Supreme Court noted, however, that all of the additional
terms are amalgamations of several humans usually acting toward a singular similar goal. See
FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 404-05 (2011) ("We have no doubt that 'person,' in a legal
setting, often refers to artificial entities. The Dictionary Act makes that clear.").
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"anthropomorphized virtual assistants" to the statutory definition of
"person," but this has the potential to create difficulties in
implementation if Congress fails to further define the term. Having
this language within the Act, however, may provide a statutory basis
by which courts can implement the objective reasonableness test
described above when interpreting applicability of the statute.192
Congress may be wary of changing the definition of "person"
within the Dictionary Act because the change may imbue Alexa, other
virtual assistants, and smart-home technology with rights that the
technology cannot yet exercise.193 It is important to note, however,
that Congress is not limited to simply amending the statutory
definition of "person." Congress may find a better solution by
adopting an entirely new statute that makes use of the same empirical
considerations as the above-described common law approach.194 The
research regarding the criteria courts should consider when
developing an objective reasonableness test should also inform
Congress's approach in adopting a new, legally distinctive category for
anthropomorphized virtual assistants subjected to assigned agency.
Political pressure for such a change, however, is likely to occur only
once the US public realizes the vulnerability of their communications
with these virtual assistants and believes that it is acceptable and
normal to view them as deserving of legal distinction.195
B. Treating Alexa as a "Person" Does Not Alone Provide Sufficient
Protection of Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment
Giving Alexa some kind of legal personhood does not eliminate
the privacy concerns present in the status quo of treating her as
nothing more than a machine. Within the existing legal framework of
192. See supra Part III.A.1.
193. Those nonhuman entities that fall within the definition of a person within the
Dictionary Act are capable of exercising rights just the same as the humans who naturally fall
within this definition. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768-69 (2014)
(holding that a for-profit corporation may exercise religious liberties as it is a "person" within the
Dictionary Act).
194. See Jaeger & Levin, supra note 30, at 4.
195. Privacy concerns are an important consideration for the public, particularly when it
comes to the government's ability to intrude within one's home. See Christopher Slobogin &
Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment
Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society", 42 DUKE
L.J. 727, 738 tbl.1 (1993) (showing empirically gathered data wherein government invasions into
the home were rated as some of the most intrusive to one's expectation of privacy); see also
Samuel J.H. Beutler, Note, The New World of Mobile Communication: Redefining the Scope of
Warrantless Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 375, 387 (2013)
(noting that an individual's home "represents the zenith of privacy expectations").
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reasonable expectations of privacy in communications with third
parties, recognition of this new status simply shifts the analysis from
consideration of Amazon as the relevant third party to Alexa herself.
Courts consistently maintain that there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy in the communications made between individuals, as "[t]he
risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an
informer . . . is probably inherent in the conditions of human
society."'96 Succinctly put, "[this] is the kind of risk we necessarily
assume whenever we speak."1 97 Applying this principle specifically to
the context of the home, the Supreme Court has found no Fourth
Amendment violation when an individual was voluntarily invited into
another's home, despite the fact that a police officer was listening to
the entire conversation via a concealed wire. 198 Thus, since the user
voluntarily brings Alexa-in this scenario, a legal person as a matter
of law-into his or her home, the same analysis would likely apply
because the two situations are conceptually identical. As such,
regardless of bestowing legal personhood upon Alexa, this result
would be identical to the way courts are currently likely to treat the
recordings collected by Alexa. This failure of doctrine to adequately
protect the privacy interests enjoyed within the home-which are
paramount'99 -necessitates that courts take a drastic measure to
prevent further privacy invasions.
C. A New Privilege Should Be Created Between Users and Their
Virtual Assistants
Courts have had total purview of the creation of privileges
since Congress enacted the broad language of Federal Rule of
Evidence 501, which states that "the common law-as interpreted by
United States courts in the light of reason and experience-governs a
196. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963). While Lopez was decided prior to
the creation of the reasonable expectation of privacy test, the reasoning applied in its approach
to inter-person communications is consistent with the test's approach to privacy concerns.
Compare id., with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
("[C]onversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation
of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.").
197. Lopez, 373 U.S. at 465.
198. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751-52 (1952). It should be noted that
this case was decided on a Fourth Amendment analysis grounded in trespass, as opposed to
expectations of privacy, but despite this, courts have consistently affirmed the holding in this
case. See id.; see also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750 & n.4 (1971) ("We see no
indication in Katz that the Court meant . .. to disturb the result in the On Lee case.").
199. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317 (1971) ("[O]ver the
years the Court consistently has been most protective of the privacy of the dwelling.").
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claim of privilege."200 In choosing this broad language, Congress
explicitly rejected an initial draft proposed by the Supreme Court that
contained thirteen individual evidentiary privilege rules.20 1  The
purpose of including this broad rule at the outset was to allow the
judiciary to develop a uniform set of rules through case law for federal
courts to use in evaluating privilege;202 it also gave courts "greater
flexibility in developing rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis."203
As such, "federal courts have . . . confirm[ed] the eight privileges
which existed in the common law prior to 1973 and . . . introduce[d]
one new privilege."204 The privileges currently recognized by federal
courts include (1) required reports, (2) attorney-client, (3)
psychotherapist-patient, (4) spousal, (5) clergyman-penitent, (6)
political vote, (7) trade secrets, (8) state secrets, and (9) the identity of
an informer.205
There are two basic models that inform whether a privilege
should exist-the instrumental model and the humanistic model.206
The instrumental model relies upon four criteria, famously articulated
by Dean Wigmore:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation.
20 7
According to Wigmore, "[t]he second and third [criteria] are the
most pertinent to the specific task of identifying the relationships that
deserve the protection of an evidentiary privilege."208 Wigmore based
the second criterion on "[t]he assumption . . . that absent the
200. FED. R. EVID. 501.
201. PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN & SUSAN W. CRUMP, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 1:2 (2d
ed. 2006).
202. Id.
203. Id. § 1:2 n.7.
204. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 6.2 (3d
ed. Supp. 2018) (alterations in original) (noting that the psychotherapist-patient privilege was
created by the Supreme Court in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996)).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. § 3.2.3 (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 527-28 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961)).
208. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 204, § 6.2.
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assurance of confidentiality furnished by the privilege, the typical
person would probably be unwilling to confer or communicate with the
confidant."209 The third criterion is satisfied when "the relationship[]
[is] so fundamental to contemporary society that 'in the opinion of the
community' [it] 'ought to be sedulously fostered."'
2 10
The humanistic model, by comparison, has three criteria
distinct from those required under the instrumental model:
(1) the relationship is a consultative one;
(2) there is a firm societal understanding that the consultant's task is to single-
mindedly help the other person pursue his or her interests and make an intelligent
choice; and
(3) the consultative relationship is centered on choice in an area of the person's life
implicating a fundamental ife preference.2 1 1
In sum, "a privilege should attach only if the persons stand in a
certain type of consultative relationship with respect to a particular
type of choice."212 The type of relationship that would warrant a
privilege under this model exists "when it is understood that the
confidant is to put all other interests aside and assist the person to
make an enlightened choice furthering the person's interests."213
Regardless of which model applies to the relationship between a
virtual assistant and its user, courts should adopt a privilege to
protect communications shared between them.
1. Instrumental Model
The relationship between a user and Alexa-when Alexa is
treated as a "person"-satisfies all of the criteria of the instrumental
model and therefore deserves protection. In terms of Wigmore's first
category, communications with Alexa undoubtedly "originate in a
confidence that they will not be disclosed."214 The fact that the virtual
assistants share communications with a third party should no longer
be sufficient to dismiss an expectation of privacy due to the
inappropriateness of categorizing communications as either wholly






214. See id. § 3.2.3.
215. See If These Walls Could Talk, supra note 12, at 1931 (discussing how the
dichotomous categorization of communications as either private or public is no longer applicable
to the nature of communication in today's technological environment); see also Kimberly A.
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that a third party can maintain the recordings made by Alexa, it is
likely that her users are not fully aware that forced disclosure of said
recordings is easily at the government's fingertips.216
The second and third criteria of the instrumental model rely
upon the same kind of evidence to demonstrate satisfaction.
Specifically, this will rely upon two factors: (1) the public's response
upon becoming fully aware of the extent to which the government can
currently access this information,217 and (2) the demonstration that
the asserted privilege also "serv[es] public ends."218
If a court determines that the third-party doctrine applies to
recordings Amazon collects through Alexa, the public will likely
understand that the use of such technology allows the government to
access private conversations within the home. As such, a reasonable
response will likely be for users to limit the extent of their
communications with Alexa as much as possible. The Supreme Court
has addressed similar concerns arising out of the psychotherapist-
patient relationship, holding that the failure to adopt a privilege
would have a chilling effect on communications between these parties,
thus defeating the relationship's fundamental purpose.219
Further, with respect to these criteria, courts weigh the value
of the evidence that may be lost by adopting a privilege between the
parties against the public interest that the privilege furthers.220 The
public interest served by the adoption of such a privilege between man
and machine could be substantial. Both citizens and courts view the
sanctity of the home against unreasonable government intrusion as
paramount.221 Within the home, individuals should be able to engage
Houser & Debra Sanders, The Use of Big Data Analytics by the IRS: Efficient Solutions or the
End of Privacy as We Know It?, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 855 n.281 (2017) ("[T]he third
party doctrine was established long before the Internet. While the third party doctrine may well
apply to public postings, . . . the same reasoning cannot hold for private online activities (such as
a Google search).").
216. Cf. Brief for Empirical Fourth Amendment Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 3-5, Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402 (argued Nov. 29, 2017), 2017 WL
3530963, at *3-5 (discussing how empirical research about actual subjective expectations of
privacy undermines the necessary assumption regarding whether individuals knowingly and
voluntarily convey information to third parties).
217. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1996) (discussing the chilling effects of a lack
of privilege as a significant factor when considering whether to recognize a privilege).
218. Id. at 11 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
219. Id. at 11-12.
220. Id. at 2 (noting that in contrast to the public and private interests supporting
recognition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, "the likely evidentiary benefit that would
result from the denial of the privilege is modest").
221. See U.S. CONST. amend IV; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980); Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309, 317 (1971); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967); Jaeger &
Levin, supra note 30, at 15; Beutler, supra note 195, at 387.
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in unhindered, open expression without the fear that anything and
everything said could one day be used against them by the
government. Courts should see this as a compelling public interest in
maintaining the ability to engage in this free and open expression
within one's home. The potential loss of evidence seems to be minimal
as well, as recordings from Alexa have only been sought as potential
evidence in a single case222 despite the technology being in existence
for over three years.223 Thus, the "element of confidentiality [will] be
essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation
between the parties."224  Further, once the US public sees how
intrusive government access can be within their homes, "[t]he relation
[will] be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered."225 Courts and the public agree that the home
should be a place where the government's ability to intrude upon
individuals' privacy must be most restrained.226
The final criterion is the most difficult to analyze. Due to the
limited implication of virtual assistant technology in criminal cases
despite its now widespread availability, it would seem that the benefit
to the government of submitting evidence derived from such
technology would be slim. 2 2 7 1n contrast, the injury that the parties
would suffer if Alexa's recordings were admissible could be immense.
Considering the instrumental model's second and third elements, the
public will find the possible level of government intrusion intolerable,
as privacy concerns consistently rank highest among Americans'
considerations of government overreach.228 Thus, a balance of the
222. See McLaughlin, supra note 14.
223. See Press Release, Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon Echo Now Available to All Customers
(Jun. 23, 2015), http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=176060&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=2061798 [https://perma.cc/LX5L-B9JT].
224. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 204, § 3.2.3 (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at
527-28 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)).
225. Id.
226. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 316 (1971) ("[O]ver the years the Court
consistently has been most protective of the privacy of the dwelling."); Slobogin & Schumacher,
supra note 195, at 737 (showing a table of empirically gathered data regarding individuals'
actual expectations of privacy regarding types of government intrusions measured relatively
against each other).
227. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 204, § 3.2.3 ("The injury that would inure to the
relation by the disclosure of the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained
for the correct disposal of litigation."); see also McLaughlin, supra note 14. See generally Press
Release, Amazon.com, Inc., supra note 223.
228. As late as March 2017, a Pew Research Poll showed that 87 percent of respondents
to a questionnaire found that the right to privacy was essential to their own sense of freedom.





anticipated injury and benefit weighs in favor of satisfying the model's
fourth element. Since all four of the relevant criteria are satisfied
under the instrumental model, courts should recognize a privilege
protecting the communications between users and their virtual
assistants subjected to an assignment of agency.229
2. Humanistic Model
The humanistic model is the ideal means by which courts can
justify creating a privilege for communications between virtual
assistants subject to assigned agency and their users. The
relationship between such technology and its users can be classified as
"consultative" under the model's first element.230 Alexa acts as an
assistant o the user by responding to requests and providing answers
to queries.231 When one person consults with another, he or she seeks
information or advice from the other party;232 Alexa provides both by
either fully answering the questions posed to her or pointing the
inquirer in the best direction to have his or her query answered. The
second criterion requires that Alexa "single-mindedly help the other
person pursue his or her interests and make an intelligent choice."233
The user's interests certainly outweigh Alexa's, as the virtual
assistant has no personal interests to be balanced; thus, the
communication certainly satisfies this criterion. Without the potential
for conflict of interests between the parties, Alexa does nothing but
"single-mindedly pursue [her user's] interests."234
The final criterion requires that the subject matter of the
communication relate to "fundamental life preference choices."235 This
criterion may, at first, appear unsatisfied by the types of
communications in which a user and Alexa engage, but as
Imwinkelried points out, "the applicability of a privilege to the type of
relationship in question . . . does not dictate the conclusion that every
communication between parties standing in that relationship is
privileged."236 Thus, much like the relationship between an attorney
and client, the user-defendant can invoke the privilege when a certain
229. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 204, § 3.2.3 (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285,
at 527-28 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)).
230. Id. § 5.4.3
231. See Baguley & McDonald, supra note 7.
232. See Consult, NEw OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010).
233. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 204, § 3.2.3; see also id. § 5.4.3 (describing the contours of
this fiduciary duty requirement).
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type of communication begins between the parties.237 Inquiries made
to Alexa that do not pertain to such "fundamental life preference
choices" may fall outside the scope of a privilege created for a user's
relationship with Alexa. 2 38  As such, courts could subject
communications falling outside the privilege to the current standard
for collection of such communications, which does not provide the level
of protection homeowners would expect regarding such
communications.2 3 9
Both models generally appear to support the creation of a new
privilege for communications between virtual assistants and their
users. Limitations to the immediate creation of this privilege
certainly exist, however, particularly with respect to the prerequisite
adoption of some form of personhood for anthropomorphized
technology.240 The humanistic model seems more favorable to the
creation of a privilege, but the "fundamental life preference"
requirement limits the model's applicability.2 4 1 It is difficult to say
how often a user engages in such communications with Alexa at this
point, but this information may be quantifiable in the future. Virtual
assistants will continue to develop as Al continually advances. It is
not beyond imagination to think that there will come a time when
virtual assistant technology offers such a complete experience of
communicative interaction that users turn to it rather than seeking
out a therapist, a lawyer, or perhaps even a spouse.242 If and when
technology assumes the mantle of performing the kinds of roles
recognized under privilege law,2 43 it will almost certainly become
appropriate to adopt a similar privilege for the technology. However,
that may still require more time-and several scientific
breakthroughs.
237. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).
238. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 204, § 3.2.3.
239. See supra Parts II.C, III.B.
240. See supra Part III.A.
241. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 204, § 3.2.3. This requirement's limited applicability
stems from its narrow scope, which greatly limits which communications may qualify for
protection. It would be hard to say that asking Alexa about the weather or trying to figure out
the capital of Somalia and other typical inquiries made of Alexa can be classified as
"fundamental life preferences."
242. See, e.g., HER (Warner Bros. Pictures 2013).
243. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 204, § 3.2.3 (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285,




The presence of an ever-listening and recording "person" within
the home upon whom the government can call to testify against you at
will is the actualization of an Orwellian nightmare.244 Under the
likely applicable jurisprudence regarding virtual assistant echnology,
the US public has no way to prevent government access to
communications made within earshot of the device. As concerns for
one's privacy become an increasingly prevalent aspect of political
debate and as smart-home technology continues to advance, the time
to address this issue is now. That people see these virtual assistants
as something more akin to a person rather than a piece of technology
informs the steps that Congress or the courts should take to limit the
government's ability to use such technology against users. When a
reasonable person views this technology as something like a person.
rather than a machine, the law should adopt a specific legal category
to classify this technology and protect the resulting communications.
A shift in categorization allows both Congress and the courts to
make the necessary distinctions between smart-home technology with
anthropomorphic properties and wholly inanimate recording devices
devoid of perceptions of agency. Applying a new categorical
distinction to the current legal structure allows for maximum privacy
protections of an individual's home, as the Constitution intended.245
Furthermore, this new distinction accounts for the inevitable
advancements that this technology will undergo, wherein the
differences between it and wholly inanimate machines will only
become more concrete. Rather than falling behind the reality in which
society exists, as is so often the case with the law, the judicial and
legislative branches of the government have the opportunity to act
preemptively instead of reactively. A preventative response protects
the security and privacy of US homes to the fullest extent possible.
Alexa may always be listening, but at least she will not be sharing
what she hears with anyone who asks.
Christopher B. Burkett*
244. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
245. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317 (1971).
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